Russo v. State Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 43996 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-9-2016
Russo v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43996
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation




IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
MICHAEL ROWE RUSSO, ) 
     ) 
 Plaintiff-Appellant,  ) NO. 43996 
     )  
v.     ) Canyon Co.  CV-PC-2015-7512 
     ) 
STATE OF IDAHO,   )  
     ) 







APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD  JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER  S. NYE  
District Judge  
________________________ 
 
GREG S. SILVEY     KENNETH K. JORGENSEN  
Attorney at Law     Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 565     Criminal Law Division 
Star, Idaho 83669     P.O. Box 83720 
       Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 286-7400     (208) 334-2400 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR      ATTORNEY FOR 
APPELLANT     RESPONDENT  
i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
 Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
 
 Statement of the Facts and 
 Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1 
ISSUE  .................................................................................................................. 6 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 7 
The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing the Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief  ......................................................................... 7 
 
A. Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal .......................... 7 
 
B. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of  
 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ......................................... 8 
 
  C. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of 
   Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel ......................... 8 
 
  D. The Claims and the Court’s Rulings ..................................... 9 
 
  E. The Court Erred in Summarily Denying the 
   Petition ............................................................................... 14 
 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................. 22 
ii 
 






Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986) ................................................................. 8 
 
Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759 (Ct.App. 1991) ................................................ 7 
 
Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994) ................................................. 7 
 
Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40 (Ct.App. 2007) ............................ 8-9 
 
Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App. 1994) ................................................... 7 
 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995) ................................................... 7 
 
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129 (1989) ........................................................ 8 
 







Idaho Code § 19-4901 .......................................................................................... 7 
 
I.R.C.P. 56 ............................................................................................................ 7 
 
I.R.E. 403 ........................................................................................................... 13
1 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Petitioner appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for 
post-conviction relief.   
In short, this case concerned a forcible stranger rape.  An extreme  close-
up video of sexual intercourse was found on the defendant’s phone. At trial,  the 
victim's gynecologist testified that the victim   was the female in the video based 
upon various physical characteristics of her pubic  area.  
Petitioner  made various claims of ineffective assistance of trial and 
appellate counsel  concerning the failure to properly object to this crucial 
testimony or pursue it on  appeal.  
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Supreme Court described the underlying criminal case in its published 
opinion in the direct appeal in State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299 (2014):  
In the predawn hours of August 27, 2009, a woman sleeping in the 
bedroom of her apartment in Nampa, Canyon County, Idaho, 
awakened to see an unknown male standing over her with a knife 
in his hand. He was wearing a mask that covered his face and 
exposed his eyes. He put a hand over her mouth and held a knife 
against her throat, and he then stated that she was going to 
cooperate. He initially attempted several sexual acts, but was 
unable to obtain an erection. He then had her lie on her back at the 
bottom of the bed, where he raped her. He wore a condom and 
used his cell phone to take photos of her during the rape. Before 
leaving, he took her sheets and a pillow case. He also had her 
remove the battery from her cell phone, and he placed it under 
clothing in her panty drawer. She ran to a neighbor's house, where 
she called 911. Defendant was immediately the focus of law 
enforcement. 
The Nampa police had been investigating Michael Russo 
(Defendant) for an assault and battery that had occurred in Nampa 
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on August 21, 2008. The victim, a young woman, and a female 
friend were alone on the second floor of the friend's home when a 
male appeared in the doorway of the room they were in. He was 
wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt, black hat, and blue jeans, and 
he stated that there was a fire in the basement. The victim noticed 
that he was wearing blue latex gloves. She ran downstairs and 
looked into the basement, but did not see any indication of a fire, 
and the man followed her down the stairs. She told him that there 
was no fire, and he responded that two children had run down into 
the basement. She walked down into the basement to check, and 
the man followed her. Once they were in the basement, the man 
lunged at her and attempted to strangle her. In the ensuing 
struggle, he pushed her down onto a sofa, put his hand across her 
mouth, and told her he had a knife. She began screaming and 
kicked him in the stomach, and he fled. The victim and her friend 
ran after him, and the friend noticed that there was a black 
motorcycle in the area. They then called the police. 
An officer stopped a man who matched the description of the 
assailant about two blocks from the crime scene, and the man 
identified himself as Michael Russo, but claimed to have no 
identification. He had fresh blood on the right side of his face and 
neck, which he asserted to be the result of a shaving accident. He 
said that he was there because his motorcycle had broken. The 
officer asked Defendant to empty his pockets, and when he 
complied he produced identification. Two men then drove up and 
stated that they had seen someone running, but Russo was not that 
person. Defendant was acting nervously and volunteered that he 
had been involved in a robbery where a rape occurred in 1995. In 
actuality, Defendant had been convicted of rape in Washington in 
1995 and was a registered sex offender. 
The following day, Corporal Angela Weekes of the Nampa Police 
Department interviewed Defendant. During the interview, he denied 
involvement in the assault and battery, but he consented to a 
search of his computer. The computer contained several videos of 
women being violently raped, and some of the search criteria in the 
computer included rape fantasies. Defendant  stated that prior to 
raping the woman in Washington, he had watched pornography 
that contained women being raped. He also said that he fantasized 
about raping a girl who would get turned on during the rape and 
decide she liked it; that he fantasized about being dominant over 
someone; and that he still struggled with issues involving 
aggression and sexual boundaries. 
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After the Nampa police responded to the victim's apartment in this 
case and spoke with the victim, Defendant became the focus of 
their investigation. They contacted the Meridian police, who sent an 
officer to Defendant's apartment in Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
When the officer arrived there at 5:47 a.m., the lights were on in the 
apartment. He confirmed that Defendant was inside the apartment, 
and he checked Defendant's motorcycle that was parked outside 
and determined that the engine was still warm. The Meridian officer 
stayed outside Defendant's apartment for about an hour and left 
when he was relieved by Detective Deborah Cain of the Nampa 
Police Department. Another Nampa officer later arrived at about 
8:30 a.m., and they both kept the apartment under surveillance. 
Corporal Weekes contacted Detective Ray Ellis of the Meridian 
Police Department and asked him to obtain a search warrant from a 
judge in Ada County, and he did. In his affidavit, Detective Ellis 
provided the information described above; information concerning 
the rape of a young woman working as a barista in Fruitland, Idaho, 
on July 8, 2009, and Defendant's conduct at that coffee shop the 
day and evening before the rape; and information concerning 
Defendant's 1995 rape of a young woman working as a barista at a 
coffee shop in Washington. On August 27, 2009, at 11:10 a.m., the 
magistrate judge issued a search warrant authorizing the police to 
search Defendant's residence and motorcycle and to seize, as 
evidence of the crime of rape, certain described items that may be 
located in those places, including a cellular phone. As soon as 
Detective Ellis had obtained the search warrant, he informed 
Corporal Weekes that the warrant had been issued, and he then 
proceeded to Defendant's apartment with the warrant. Corporal 
Weekes and two other Nampa detectives then headed to 
Defendant's apartment. 
At about 11:50 a.m., Detective Cain saw Defendant leave his 
apartment and walk to his mailbox. She called Corporal Weekes, 
and then she and the other Nampa officer detained Defendant at 
his mailbox. Corporal Weekes performed a patdown search of 
Defendant and removed his wallet and a cell phone from his 
pockets. She told him that he was not being arrested but was being 
detained for investigation, and she handcuffed him and placed him 
in a patrol car. About five minutes later, Detective Brice King of the 
Nampa Police Department arrived, and Corporal Weekes gave him 
the cell phone. He looked through what was stored on the phone 
and saw a video of a condom-covered penis penetrating a shaved 
vagina. He then turned the phone off. 
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The officers searched Defendant's apartment pursuant to the 
warrant, and they found, among other items of evidence, two cell 
phones. Later that afternoon, Detective Ellis went back to the 
magistrate court to obtain an amended search warrant for the 
search of the two cell phones found in Defendant's apartment and 
the cell phone taken from his person. He presented to the court an 
amended affidavit, which included all of the information contained in 
the initial affidavit and additional information, including the 
statement: "Additionally, a cellular phone was recovered from Mr. 
Russo's person during a pat down search for officer safety. This 
phone was opened and looked at to determine ownership. Your 
affiant knows that a video was located on that phone that appears 
to depict the victim from this morning's rape." Based upon the 
amended affidavit, the magistrate judge issued a search warrant on 
August 27, 2009, at 3:15 p.m. authorizing the search of the three 
cell phones. 
Id., p. 302-303.  
 The Supreme Court explained the procedure of the criminal case as 
follows: 
Defendant was indicted for the rape. Prior to his trial, he moved to 
suppress various items of evidence including the video found on 
the cell phone that was on his person. The district court denied his 
motion to suppress. During the subsequent jury trial, the victim's 
gynecologist testified that the victim   was the woman in the video 
based upon various physical characteristics of her vaginal area. 
Prior to trial, the State also gave notice that it intended to offer 
evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) of various prior bad 
acts of Defendant. The district court refused to permit most of the 
proffered evidence to be admitted, but it held, over objection, that 
the State could present evidence of Defendant's rape fantasies and 
of pornography found in his possession that depicted rape. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of the 
felony crimes of Rape, of Kidnapping in the First Degree 
(kidnapping for the purpose of raping the person kidnapped), and of 
Burglary. For the crime of Rape, the district court sentenced 
Defendant to fixed life in the custody of the Idaho Board of 
Correction without the possibility of parole. For the crime of 
Kidnapping in the First Degree, the court sentenced him to life in 
the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction, with the first forty 
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years of that sentence fixed. For the crime of Burglary, the court 
sentenced him to a fixed ten years in the custody of the Idaho 
Board of Correction. The latter two sentences were ordered to run 
concurrently with the fixed life sentence for Rape. 
Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to 
suppress and the admission of the Rule 404(b) evidence. The 
appeal was first heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed Defendant's convictions. He then filed a petition for review 
with this Court, which we granted. . . . We likewise affirm 
Defendant's convictions. 
Id., p. 303-304. 
 
Mr. Russo then timely filed a pro se form verified petition for post-
conviction  relief along with a sworn statement of facts.  (R. p. 4-15, 16-21.)  The 
court granted his request that counsel be appointed. (R. p. 63-66, 73-74.)   
The state filed an answer and a Motion for Summary Dismissal. (R. p. 86-
89, 90-104.)  The state attached various items from the underlying criminal case 
as exhibits, including the trial transcript, which are also exhibits on appeal. (R. p. 
87-88.) 
A hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal was held. (R. p. 
139.)  The court took the matter under advisement. (R. p. 139.) 
Later, the  court issued its Order Granting State’s Motion For Summary 
Dismissal and Dismissing Petition (hereinafter Order). (R. p.  139-162.)  A 
separate judgment was entered. (R. p. 172-173.) 
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which the court denied. 
(R. p. 174-181, 194-202.) 




Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing 




The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing the Petition  
for Post-Conviction Relief  
 
A. Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal  
 
 An application for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19-4901 is 
civil in nature and is an entirely new proceeding distinct from the criminal action 
which led to the conviction.  Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App. 1994).   In 
order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which the request for post-
conviction relief is based. Id.     
 Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment 
under I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable inferences made in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 
759 (Ct.App. 1991).   Allegations contained in the verified petition are deemed 
true for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing should be 
held.  Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994).    If the allegations do not 
frame a genuine issue of material fact, the court may grant a motion to summarily 
dismiss, but if the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must 
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id.      
 In determining whether a motion for summary disposition was properly 
granted, the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to 
petitioner and determines whether, if true, they would entitle petitioner to relief. 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995). 
8 
 
B. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of 
 Counsel 
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984).  The "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result."  Id. at 686. 
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in 
order to be entitled to relief.  The defendant must demonstrate both that his 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different.  Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 
116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986). 
C. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of 
Appellate Counsel 
 The standards regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel were 
detailed in Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40 (Ct.App. 2007): 
Mintun's claim that he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel because appointed counsel should have raised certain 
additional issues on appeal are subject to the standards set forth in 
Strickland, and Mintun therefore must show that appellate counsel's 
performance was deficient and caused prejudice in the outcome of 
the appeal. An indigent defendant does not have a constitutional 
right to compel appointed appellate counsel to press all 
nonfrivolous arguments that the defendant wishes to pursue. 
Rather, the process of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal 
and focusing on those more likely to prevail, far from being the 
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evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate 
advocacy. “Notwithstanding Barnes, it is still possible to bring a 
Strickland claim based on counsel's failure to raise a particular 
claim, but it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was 
incompetent.” “[O]nly when ignored issues are clearly stronger than 
those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of 
counsel be overcome.”  
 
Id., 168 P.3d at p. 45 (internal citations omitted). 
 
D.  The Claims and the Court’s Rulings 
As characterized by the district court in its Order, Mr. Russo’s claims for 
relief were as follows: 
1. Prosecutorial misconduct for failing to disclose the criminal   
history of two witnesses: the victim and Kevin Gutierrez; 
 
2. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for: 
 
a. Failing to present evidence in the suppression motion; 
b. Failing to object or point out inconsistencies in 
cellphone evidence; 
c. Failing to question whether the entire contents of the 
cellphone were disclosed; 
d. Failing to get cellphone contents independently 
verified; 
e. Failing to file a motion to dismiss; 
f. Failing to impeach Brice King and J.W.; 
g. Failing to address officers’ observations of cellphone 
contents; 
h. Failing to try to compel the State to produce the 
cellphone or its contents; 
i. Failing to move to suppress expert testimony; 
j. Failing to object to expert testimony; 
k. Failing to adequately examine and present forensic 
evidence; 
 
3. Ineffective assistance of Rule 35 counsel; and  
 
4. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
 




 Petitioner is not pursuing all of these claims in this appeal.  Instead, this 
brief is limited to the issues surrounding the identification of the victim as the 
female in Petitioner’s cell phone video. This problem actually weaves itself into 
several of the grounds of post-conviction relief.    
 In his pro se verified petition, Petitioner first raised the issue as ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on  counsel’s failure to object pre-trial or suppress 
testimony of the victim’s OB/GYN when she testified as an expert (as opposed to 
fact witness):  The petition alleged  as follows: 
14. The Petitioner alleges that his Trial Counsel’s failure to 
suppress testimony from the State’s shoeprint analyst witness and 
OB-GYN witness violated the Petitioner’s rights under Article 1 
section 13, Idaho Constitution, and Amendment 6, U.S. 
Constitution. 
 
a. Prior to trial, the Prosecution made it clear it intended to 
present expert opinion testimony from a shoeprint analyst 
and an OB-GYN Physician (see, generally, Tr., 5/11/10). 
 
b. Based on the Court’s May 13, 2010 determinations, 
seemingly defining the OB-GYN Physician as a factual 
witness rather than an expert opinion witness, and 
indicating that the shoeprint analyst’s findings were non-
incriminating (Tr., 5/13/10, p16L22-p19 L 12), the 
Petitioner’s Trial Counsel should have filed preemptive 
objections to the Prosecution presenting opinion 
testimony from either of these witnesses. 
 
c. Had the Petitioner’s Trial Counsel properly objected, prior 
to trial, the Prosecution would not have been able to 
present what ultimately turned out to be its most crucial 
testimony. Without such testimony, the Petitioner would 
not have been convicted.  
 
Petition for Post-Conviction  Relief, p. 6. (R. p. 9.) 
 
 Next, the petition raised the issue as ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
from counsel’s failure to move to dismiss or acquittal based on an insufficient 
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identification that the victim was the female on the cellphone video. The petition 
alleged as follows: 
17. The Petitioner alleges that his Trial Counsel’s failure to file a 
motion for dismissal or acquittal violated the Petitioner’s rights 
under Article 1 section 13, Idaho Constitution, and Amendment 6, 
U.S. Constitution.  
 
a. Generally, at trial, the Prosecution submitted approximately 6 
allegations to support its charges (see Aff.Facts, p4 para.24). 
The Prosecution’s primary allegation was its claim that a video 
on a cellphone belonging to the Petitioner showed the Petitioner 
raping J.W. 
 
b. The Prosecution did not produce sufficient evidence to support 
its charges. In particular, the Prosecution failed to produce a 
proper identification to support its allegation that J.W. was the 
female on the cellphone video (see Aff.Facts, p4, paras. 25-27). 
 
c. The Prosecution’s repeated references and inferences to facts 
outside the proper consideration of the jury (see Aff.Facts, pp4-
5 para28), overly increased the inherent prejudicial effect of the 
Prosecution’s presentation.  
 
d. Had the Petitioner’s Trial Counsel filed a motion for dismissal, or 
acquittal, addressing the insufficiency of the evidence as well as 
the probability that prejudice could play an unfair role in the 
jury’s determination, there is a likelihood that the motion(s) 
would have been successful. 
 
Petition for Post-Conviction  Relief, p. 8 (emphasis in the original). (R. p. 11.) 
 
 Finally, the petition alleged ineffective assistance of direct appellate 
counsel for failing to appeal the district court’s denial of trial counsel’s  mid-trial 
objection to the expert testimony of the OB-GYN:  
19. The Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief in this Count Ten of 
this matter based on ineffective assistance of Appellate Counsel. 
Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that his rights under Article 1, 
section 13, Idaho Constitution, and Amendment 6, U.S. Constitution 
were violated when his counsel on direct appeal, Eric Lehtinen, 




a. At trial, the final witness to testify during the Prosecution’s 
presentation was the OB-GYN Physician, Dr. Lisa Minge. 
b. Most of Dr. Minge’s testimony remained within the confines of 
factual-based observations (Tr., 8/4/10, p76L10-p91L2, p94 Ls16-
23). 
c. Although the Petitioner’s Trial Counsel failed to make a 
preemptive objection, once the Prosecutor elicited a response from 
Dr. Minge that fell outside the scope of factual-based observations 
and into the realm of opinion testimony, the Petitioner’s Trial 
Counsel immediately objected, stating, in part, that the witness was 
not qualified to make such opinion testimony (Tr., 8/4/10, p92 L21 - 
- p93 L23). 
d. A ruling by the District Court on May 13, 2010, denying indigent 
funds for the defense to obtain a rebuttal witness to Dr. Minge’s 
conclusions, narrowed the scope of Dr. Minge’s testimony to 
factual-based observations, effectually disqualifying her from 
testifying in the guise of expert opinion   
e. The Petitioner’s Appellate Counsel did not appeal the District 
Court’s decision to overrule the above-stated objection to the 
opinion segment of Dr. minge’s [sic] testimony.  
f. The opinion portion of Dr. Minge’s testimony, voicing the 
Prosecution’s theory regarding the identity of the female on the 
video on the Petitioner’s cellphone, was absolutely crucial to the 
Prosecution’s case. A sustained objection to that opinion portion of 
Dr. Minge’s testimony would have altered the outcome of the trial in 
favor [of] the Petitioner. 
 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, p. 9-10. (R. p. 12-13.) 
 
 The district court of course rejected all of these grounds in its  Order 
granting the state’s motion for summary dismissal. The first time the court 
discusses it is as follows: 
Petitioner also alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion to dismiss based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, 
specifically that there was not a proper identification to support its 
allegation that J.W. was the female on the video, and failed to 
argue the probability that prejudice would play an unfair role in the 
jury’s determination. As the face of the female on the video is never 
shown, it was necessary for the state to establish that it was, in 
fact, J.W. 
 
J.W. testified that the perpetrator had a cellphone, and she heard it 
and saw the light, and presumed he was taking pictures. Tr. August 
13 
 
2, 2010, p. 214-215. She also identified herself in the video. Tr. p. 
225-226. Dr. Lisa Minge, J.W.’s OBGYN, also testified that the 
female in the video was J.W., noting an uncommon combination of 
her distinctive prepuce, crease, c-section scars, and the lack of 
pubic hair. Tr. August 4, 2010, p. 86-94. The Court finds that this 
evidence was sufficient to rationally infer the identity of J.W. as the 
female in the video. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of this 
evidence would therefore have been unsuccessful. 
 
Order, p. 14. (R. p. 152.) 
 The district court went on to discuss the prejudice from this evidence, 
noting that I.R.E. 403 only requires the exclusion of evidence that is unfairly 
prejudicial such that it tends to suggest  a decision on an improper basis.  
. . . The Court does not disagree that the identification of the female 
in the video as J.W. was prejudicial to the Petitioner: however, 
there is nothing about that evidence which tended to suggest a 
decision on an improper basis. As such, this argument would not 
have warranted either suppression of the identification or dismissal.  
 
Order, p. 15. (R. p. 153.) 
 
 The district court then discusses Claims 2(i) and 2(j) which concern failing 
to move to suppress or object to expert testimony. 
Petitioner claims that counsel should have filed a motion to exclude 
the testimony of Dr. Minge, J.W.’s OBGYN and Donna Meade, the 
shoe print analyst, but he has failed to allege what the basis of such 
motion should have been. With no allegation of facts or other 
admissible evidence to provide a basis for excluding the testimony 
of these witnesses, the Court cannot find that such motions would 
have been successful or that there was a sufficient basis for a 
successful objection thereto.  
 
Order, p. 20. (R. p. 158.) 
 
Finally, the district court discussed Claim 4 regarding ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel: 
Lastly, Petitioner claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to appeal the district court’s decision overruling defense 
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counsel’s objection and allowing Dr. Minge to testify as an expert 
as to the identification of the female on the video as J.W. The 
failure to raise this issue on appeal does not necessarily result in a 
finding of deficient performance. . . .  
    . . . 
 
Petitioner has failed to set forth any cogent reason why this issue 
was stronger  tha[n] those his counsel did assert. Without such a 
showing, Petitioner has not established appellate counsel was 
ineffective. 
 
Order, p. 22. (R. p. 160.) 
 
E. The Court Erred in Summarily Denying the Petition  
  Petitioner asserts that the district court erred in summarily dismissing the 
above referred claims from the petition. In short, the district court fails to 
understand or adequately address the  issues.  
 The first step in understanding what really happened is the district court’s 
pre-trial comments on whether the victim’s OB-GYN was a fact or an expert 
witness.   In a pre-trial  hearing on May 11, 2010, the prosecutor advised the 
court that based on listening to Petitioner’s jail phone conversations they were 
made aware that based on her physical characteristics, he was disputing that the 
victim was the same female that appeared in the cell phone video. (Tr. 
5/11/2010, p. 32-33.)  Thus the prosecution was trying to identify if it was the 
same female in the video and the photograph of the victim.  (Tr. 5/11/2010, p. 32-
33.)   The prosecutor continued: 
So we went and spoke with the victim’s OB-GYN, and she has 
conveyed to us that she feels that beyond a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that that is the victim. 
 




[THE PROSECUTOR]: She’s examined the video as well as the 
photographs. And the victim is her patient as well, so.  
 
THE COURT: Okay. So I don’t—she’s going to be a fact witness. 
But I guess if she’s being asked to express an opinion, she’s also 
then an expert, but also a fact witness. Primarily a fact. Treating 
physician.  
 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Yeah. That’s correct. And she’ll be  talking 
about the female genitalia and what the different parts are. 
 
Tr. 5/11/2010, p. 33, ln. 22—p. 34, ln. 11. 
 
 Two days later at another pre-trial hearing, the court took up the matter of 
expert witnesses for the defense. As a bit of background, while the defendant’s 
trial counsel was retained there was no money for expert witnesses to rebut state 
witnesses.  Assuming an affidavit of indigence was filed, the court acknowledged 
that the court would appoint necessary expert witnesses for the defense. (Tr. 
5/11/2010, p. 38-39.)  
 Regarding an OB-GYN expert for the defense, the court stated: 
The second thing is it’s my understanding that the–and the State 
may be calling the victim’s OBGYN to testify about identifying her 
as the—one of the people in the photos or the video on the phone, 
the cell phone. I think that’s largely a fact witness. I’m not sure if 
you’re going to have an opinion from the person, or if they’re just 
going to say, look, I’m—this is—I’m the doctor, and I’m familiar with 
the person, and I do these examinations, and that -- but if there’s 
an opinion, it’s based on their factual person. So I’m not saying I’m 
going to appoint a physician for the defense. There needs to be a 
showing that that is necessary.  
 
Tr. 5/13/2010,  p. 18, ln. 14—p. 19, ln. 2.  
 
 Then, at trial, the relevant testimony of the OB-GYN was as follows: 
Q. And Doctor, after your review of the photographs in relationship 
to the video and those still photos, can you make determination 
beyond a degree of medical certainty whose pelvic region the 




[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, I object to the question. 
 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I object.  
 
THE COURT: Anything else besides your objection? 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, yes, Your Honor. If I could ask a 
couple of questions in aid of objection. 
 
QUESTIONS IN AID OF OBJECTION  
 
BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 
Q. Dr. Minge, do you have any particular expertise, schooling in 
identifying two females from photographs from just photos of their 
genital region, the pelvic region? 
 




A. No.  
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Your Honor, I object. I don’t think 
she’s qualified to make this opinion testimony.  
 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I’ll overrule the objection and 
allow the witness to answer. 
 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (RESUMED) 
 
BY [PROSECUTOR]: 
Q. Doctor, I’ll rephrase the question—or not rephrase, but ask it 
again, is can you determine beyond a degree of medical certainty 
of who’s pelvic area, the female pelvic area is in that video? 
 
A. I believe it’s [J.W.]. 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Thank you, Doctor. No further questions. 
 
THE COURT:  You may cross-examine. 
 




Q. Did you—were you able to see a belly ring in that video? 
 
A.  Not clearly enough to state it.  
 
Q. Could you see a tattoo in the video? 
 
A.  Not clearly enough to state it. 
 
Q. Could you see a mole in the video? 
 
A.  No. 
 
Q. And you’ve been a patient of hers for a year and a half—or she’s 
been a patient of yours for a year and a half? 
 
A.  Right. 
 
Q.  Thank you. Okay.   
How common is it for women of younger age, her age, to have no 
pubic hair? 
 
A.  It’s common for some part of the genitalia to be shaved or 
waxed. It is less common to be completely 100 percent without hair. 
But it is more common now than it used to be. I can’t give you an 
actual percentage. 
 
Q.  Okay. But you would imagine there’s a fairly good population in 
this area? 
 
A.  Absolutely. 
 




Q.  Doctor, is it uncommon for—let me rephrase that.  
How common is it for somebody to have the entire pubic area 
shaved, having the two C-section scars and that elongated clitoris? 
 
A.  Not very common at all. 
 




 So what happened is the court described the OB-GYN as a fact witness, 
basically the victim’s treating physician, and indicated it would not appoint a 
defense expert unless and until there was a showing of need.  
 At trial, however, the OB-GYN, moved from testifying regarding her 
patient, and instead testified as an expert in the area of female genitalia 
identification and so was able to opine unchallenged on the frequency of various 
physical characteristics in the population and thus opined that it was in fact the 
victim in the cellphone video.  
 This constitutes the several different types of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claimed by Petitioner. First, given the district court’s varying comments 
about whether the OB-GYN physician would be a fact or an expert witness, 
defense counsel should have brought a motion in limine.    
 While inartfully described as a motion to suppress by the pro se  
Petitioner, the motion would have requested to exclude expert opinions by the 
doctor since the prosecution failed to establish that the  identification of specific  
female genitalia is an even a proper subject matter for  expert testimony and that 
this doctor, regardless of her medical experience, was an expert  in said 
identification.  There was no showing that the anecdotal evidence relied on by 
the doctor for her identification is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in 
the particular field of identifying female genitalia. The doctor did not testify about 
the existence of, nor is Appellate aware of, any data bases containing data of the 
incidence of complete absence in public hair in females of the victim’s age. 
Rather, the doctor merely testified it was more common than it used to be.  The 
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same is true for the other supposedly identifying features such as C-section 
scars and the victim’s type of  prepuce.  In short,  the doctor testified in vague 
generalities like common or uncommon.   
 Even if the trial counsel was not able to exclude the doctor’s expert 
opinions, a pre-trial ruling that this was expert testimony would then provide the 
justification  necessary for the court to appoint an expert gynecologist for the 
defense. But as it was, trial counsel apparently relied on the trial court’s 
equivocal statements that the doctor was a fact witness and thus was 
unprepared to meet the expert opinions with either his own expert or at least an 
effective cross-examination that addressed the obvious flaws with the expert 
opinions.   
 Finally, as to this issue, the district court’s basis of dismissal was that 
Petitioner made no allegations forming the basis for excluding the testimony. This 
is just wrong, as shown above, the petition does exactly explain the problem, the 
district court just never addresses it.  
 Next, while trial counsel did ineffectively object to the expert opinion at 
trial,   this raises the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing 
to appeal the court’s decision to allow the expert testimony.  
 The district court doesn’t address this issue except to say  Petitioner has 
not shown that it was a stronger issue than those raised.   However, if this was a 
meritorious issue then it is necessarily stronger than the ones raised which were 
all rejected by the Supreme Court when it affirmed the conviction.  
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 And Appellant asserts it is a meritorious issue given the district court’s 
rulings.  While the physician may well have been the victim’s physician, the court 
confused  the idea of a treating physician being a fact witness with the real 
purpose of the witness in our case. The OB-GYN was actually not the treating 
physician since there is no evidence that the victim was being treated medically 
for anything related to this case. Rather, it was simply her doctor.  The victim’s 
doctor could no doubt properly testify about various characteristics of the victim 
based on the previous examinations. However, the line from treating physician to 
non-treating expert was crossed when the doctor identified the victim as being in 
the cell phone video and opined about the incidence of various characteristics in 
the populace.  
 Finally,  the court’s dismissal of the grounds that trial counsel failed  to 
bring a motion of acquittal  based on insufficient evidence ignores all the 
problems with the identification discussed above.   
 In short, the OB-GYN had to admit that she could not state that the 
victim’s conclusively identifying characteristics were present in the video, to wit, 
her tattoo and  belly button.  The doctor also had to admit that she did not see 
the victim’s  mole in the video.   Rather, the gynecologist spoke in completely 
non-referential and  unscientific terms  such as common and very uncommon.  
Tellingly, she could not give the percentage of young women who have removed 
all of their public hair and simply said it was more common than it used to be.   
 The unchallenged expert opinions of the doctor is also why Petitioner 
suffered cognizable prejudice from all of the instances  of ineffective assistance 
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of counsel.   There was absolutely no evidence of any connection between the 
victim and the Petitioner.  This includes the time period two years prior made 
relevant by a comment by the attacker.  The victim did not pick the Petitioner out 
of a visual or a voice lineup.    None of the Petitioner’s DNA was found at the 
scene. However, the DNA of a different man was found there.  
 But  the gynecologist’s certain sounding identification of the victim as the 
female in the cell phone video allowed the jury to ignore all of the other evidence. 
Had the expert opinion been excluded, or ruled on pre-trial and a defense 
prepared to the testimony, or the denial of the objection appealed, the outcome 
of the case would have been different.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the district court’s order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and vacated and the matter 
remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.  
DATED this _____ day of September, 2016.     
        
_____________________ 
      Greg S. Silvey 
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